BAKU. October 9, 2011: Russia’s Regnum News Agency recently started discussions over the Armenian claims to the Azerbaijani territories of Nagorno-Karabakh (Russian translation of ‘Mountainous Garabagh’) and Nakhchivan. Since the Armenian claims to the territories are based solely on the argument centering around the historic developments in the beginning of XX century, the whole debate has acquired a character of discussions about the early soviet history of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Below, is the contribution of Dr. Jamil Hasanli to that discussion. Jamil Hasanli has done extensive research on the Soviet period history of the Caucasus, Iran, and Turkey and the following piece was published by the Azerbaijan in the World on September 1, 2011:
Azerbaijan in the World, An Electronic Publication of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy
Vol. IV, No. 16-17 (September 1, 2011)
Moscow and the Delimitation of Karabakh in the 1920s
Jamil Hasanli, Dr.
Professor of History
Baku State University
Recently on the Regnum Russian news agency site was placed a series of essays of my landsman and fellow student S.N. Tarasov relative to the recent history of the mountainous portion of Karabakh. In these essays, the author cast doubt on its inclusion with the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920). At the same time S.N. Tarasov attempted to recount the unique course of events in connection with the well-known declaration of N. Narimanov of December 1, 1920, and repeated the distorted idea about “the transfer by Stalin” in 1921 of the mountainous part of Karabakh to Azerbaijan. To back up his assertions, the author cited archival documents. However, this selection, instead of introducing clarity in the question under consideration in fact led to its distortion, and thus instead of clarifying these events calls forth only regret.
On April 28, 1920 Soviet forces occupied Baku. A month later, Karabakh was also occupied by Russian forces, and independent Azerbaijan ceased to exist. A little later, the same fate came to Armenia and Georgia. In this way, after a two-year break, the Trans-Caucasus again fell under the power of Russia, now already Soviet Russia. After Sovietization, Azerbaijan began to catastrophically lose its territories. In the first years of Sovietization, seeing how the central government of the Bolsheviks was transferring to Armenia lands that had been Azerbaijani from time immemorial and not being willing to put up with this injustice, N. Narimanov wrote to Lenin that the lands which under the Musavat government had been considered indisputably Azerbaijani, now under Soviet power had become subject of dispute, that the people saw this and was expressing its dissatisfaction. 
The activation of Armenians in Karabakh and other places of the republic from the first days of sovietization, the unpunished realization of the policy of force against the Muslim population are to be explained in the first instance by the weakness of Azerbaijan and its army and the demobilization of its forces. On June 29, 1920 S. Kirov reported to G. Chicherin that the Dashnaks were persecuting not only Muslims, but also Russians. He wrote that, “Of the 30,000 Russians in Kars oblast remain only 15,000; the remainder either had dispersed to Turkey or to Russia or had died.” 
On June 19, N. Narimanov, M. Mdivani, A. Mikoyan, and A. Nuridzhanyan sent to G. Chicherin a telegram, in which they reported about the advance of the Dashnak army and its successes in Gazakh and Gadabay. A copy of this telegram was sent to G. Ordzhonikidze in Vladikavkaz, and it included the following notable lines: “The Armenians in fact are in a state of war with Azerbaijan. As far as the supposedly disputed Zangazur and Karabakh territories, which already are within the borders of Soviet Azerbaijan, we categorically declare that these places beyond any question must stay within the borders of Azerbaijan.” 
G.Chichern, upset by the fact that authoritative Bolsheviks from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia who had worked for many years in the Caucasus were showing resistance to the policy of the Center, sent on June 22, 1920 a letter to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) with a complaint about “the indiscipline of Baku comrades and the disturbing contradiction between their actions and the political line established by the Central Committee.” In his opinion, the transfer to Azerbaijan of the disputed territories which had now been seized by Russia would make impossible an agreement with Armenia. 
The reasoning of Chicherin on this point is interesting. He explained to Lenin that “up to now Russia has not given these lands to the Armenians so as not to offend the Tatars. When conditions are created for the sovietization of Georgia and Armenia, then all these problems will resolve themselves.”  From numerous explanatory notes and telegraphs of Chicherin to Lenin, Ordzhonikidze, and Narimanov, one thing is clear: Chicherin viewed Karabakh as something to be traded, as a decoy, in the course of negotiations with Armenia.
The strengthening of Armenian claims on the mountainous part of Karabakh forced Bolsheviks well known in the Caucasus, such as N. Narimanov, M. Mdivani, A. Mikoyan, and B. Naneyshvili, as well as even members of the military council of the XI Army Zh. Vesnik, M. Levandovsky and I. Mikhailov, to sign a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP(b), which stated that, “we consider it our duty to send to the Central Committee our single position on the question of Zangazur and Karabakh, the resolution of which during negotiations with Armenia is proceeding in ways that conflict with the interests of the revolution in the Caucasus. Karabakh under the Musavat government was entirely part of Azerbaijan. The unbroken nature of the cultural and economic ties of Karabakh and Zangazur with Baku, which provides support for thousands of workers from these provinces, and their complete separation from Yerevan was demonstrated at the peasant congress of Armenian Karabakh in 1919, which—despite the unbearable conditions for the Armenians under the Musavat regime and the provocative work of agents of Armenia—all the same decisively called for complete unity with Azerbaijan under conditions of a guarantee for the peaceful life of Armenians.” At the end of this letter, it was noted that the Muslim masses consider a betrayal the inability of Soviet power to preserve Azerbaijan in its old borders and explain this as a reflection of the pro-Armenian nature or weakness of Soviet power. Thus, those signing the document warned the center against any vacillation on the issue of Karabakh and Zangazur. 
In order to give an official character to the recognition of Armenia by Soviet Russia, G. Chicherin attempted to convince G. Ordzhonikidze that for Soviet Russia, a compromise was necessary with the Armenia’s Dashnak government. He wrote: “The Azerbaijan government declares disputable not only Karabakh and Zangazur, but also the Sharur-Daralagez district. The latter never has been declared a matter of dispute, and even the Musavat government always recognized it as part of Armenia. Without it, almost nothing would remain of Armenia. The Armenian peace delegation after lengthy resistance agreed to recognize Karabakh and Zangazur as disputable hoping that at the end of the day a significant portion of these localities will be given to Armenia, but they in no case agreed to recognize Sharur-Daralagez district as a matter of dispute. On the other hand, we must achieve agreement from the Azerbaijani government so that our treaty with Armenia will not be in contradiction with the demands of Azerbaijan. Given the enormity of your influence in Baku, we ask You to use it in order to get from the Azerbaijan government its assurance that it considered Karabakh and Zangazur matters of dispute, but not Sharur-Daralagez district. 
After Chicherin’s code cable of July 2, 1920 and discussion with the newly assigned plenipotentiary representatives of Soviet Russia in Armenia B. Legran and A. Gabrielyan, G. Ordzhonikidze by direct line reported to Moscow the following: “Azerbaijan insists on the immediate and unqualified recognition of Karabakh and Zangazur as part of its territory. In my opinion, this is necessary to do since both districts are economically drawn to Baku and are completely cut off from Yerevan, especially now with the Bayazet Turkish division cutting them off. … According to the words of Comrade Gabrielyan, the Armenian delegation unconditionally will go along. With this resolution of the issue, Azerbaijan can be forced to agree to the cession of the remaining territories. My opinion is the following: Karabakh and Zangazur must be immediately joined to Azerbaijan. I will force Azerbaijan to declare these regions autonomies, but this must come from Azerbaijan and not in any case must be mentioned in the treaty [with Armenia].” 
In another report to V.I. Lenin, I. Stalin and G. Chicherin on direct line, G. Ordzhonikidze openly reported that the Armenian government was intentionally introducing confusion on these issues: “Today Gabrielyan declared to me that the Armenian delegation, if Azerbaijan dropped its claims on Sharur-Daralagez district and the Nakhchivan district, would agree to the immediate unification of Karabakh and Zangazur to Azerbaijan. We agreed that on our arrival to Baku we would discuss this with Narimanov. As you see, there is no lack of clarity or understanding here. I can assure you that we quite clearly represented our peace policy and will continue to carry it out. I am certain and this is my deep conviction that for the strengthening of Soviet power in Azerbaijan and out continued holding of Baku, it is necessary to unite Nagorno-Karabakh [with Azerbaijan] and that there cannot be any vacillation about the plain portion of it. It was always Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan will guarantee the security of the Armenian population of this district with its head. We will declare an autonomy here and promise the Armenian population that it will be protected and that Muslim military units will not be introduced there.”
G. Ordzhnokidze warned that “a different decision on this issue will threaten our position in Azerbaijan and will win us nothing in Armenia. I completely well understand that the possibility cannot be excluded that we may need Armenia under certain political circumstances. Decide as you see necessary. We will follow all your directions. But permit me to bring to Your attention that such an attitude to Azerbaijan will strongly compromise us in the eyes of the broad masses of Azerbaijan and benefit to the highest degree our opponents.” 
After the April 1920 turn of events, G. Ordzhonikidze for a certain time in Azerbaijan-Georgian and Azerbaijan-Armenian relations took the side of Azerbaijan, which was considered “Soviet Russia’s firstborn in the East,” and this seriously disturbed some in Moscow and particularly in the Peoples Commissariat for International Affairs. G. Chicherin, who headed this group, opposed Ordzhonikidze and called his position “concealed Orientalist and Muslimophile.” In response to this, G. Ordzhonikidze said that his views had no relation to Muslim nationalism and that in his family there is not a single Tatar. 
G. Ordzhonikidze knew perfectly well who in the Center was muddying the waters and therefore in his transmission of the next reports by direct line he asked N. Alliluyeva to report to Stalin that Chicherin and Karakhan were again putting him “here in a hopeless position.”  G. Chicherin showed an entirely different position when he wrote to Ordzhonikidze a telegram on July 8, which said the following: “We know quite well that the moment for Sovietization is also coming to Armenia, but to go in that direction now is premature. The most important thing which can be achieved now is the declaration of Karabakh and Zangazur as disputed regions, and for this it is necessary that the Azerbaijani government give its agreement. We need this [because] we absolutely must conclude a treaty with Armenia. The world situation requires this, and for this we must declare Karabakh and Zangazur, but no more, subjects of dispute.” 
G. Chicherin and L. Karakhan directed the policy of the Peoples Commissariat for International Affairs concerning cooperation with Armenia at the expense of Azerbaijan. Not having been able to block this policy, G. Ordzhonikidze on July 16 sent a telegram to V.I. Lenin, I. Stalin and G. Chicherin containing a request that peace with Armenia not be concluded prior to the arrival of the Azerbaijani delegation. He wrote: “Peace with Armenia without the participation of Azerbaijan will seriously disturb comrades here.”  A. Mikoyan, a member of the Central Committee of the ACP(b), shared these positions and on June 29, he wrote to Ordzhonikidze: “We are indignant at the policy of the Center as regards Karabakh and Zangazur. You also defend our point of view before the Center. We are not against peace with Armenia, but in no case at the price of Karabakh and Zangazur.” 
As we can see, it looked very strange that Soviet Russia and Dashnak Armenia were conducting secret negotiations concerning Azerbaijan without its participation and agreement. What was taking place with Armenia was actually an exact reflection of what had occurred with Georgia a month earlier. Then, there were many interesting places in the coded portion of the telegram which Ordzhonikidze and Kirov sent to Lenin and Stalin. They considered that the conclusion of an agreement with Georgia without the clarification of the position of Azerbaijan would lead to the failure of Soviet policy. Ordzhonikidze and Kirov wrote the following: “Why in concluding a treaty with Georgia are we refusing to conclude a treaty with fraternal Azerbaijan. If the Azerbaijani question is decided otherwise, please inform us.” Then by special code, they warned the Center: “Not in any case should Karakhan be allowed to be the leader of eastern policy. The entire Zakatala scandal [a reference to the promise to transfer the Zakatala district to Georgia according to the Moscow Treaty of May 7, 1920] is understood here as the work of an Armenian.” 
There is no doubt that L. Karakhan played an important role in the formation and implementation of the anti-Azerbaijani policy of the NKID of Soviet Russia. Both coded and open documents of that time point to his intrigues in the Karabakh question. For example, G. Ordzhonikidze openly wrote: “Karabakh is a second Zakatala of our foreign commissariat. Here is taking place a colossal provocation, which is being carried out by Armenians in Moscow.” 
However, despite the strong pressure of the Center on Azerbaijan, it was not able to achieve its rapprochement with the position of Armenia. The negotiations of S. Kirov with Peoples Commissar M.D. Huseynov and the Armenian representatives in Tiflis failed to yield results. On August 6, he wrote to Chicherin that, as a result, he was able to gain only one thing from the Azerbaijanis: they were ready to yield to Armenians the Sharur-Daralagez district, but the rest, that is Nakhchivan district, Ordubad, Dzhulfa, Zangazur, and Karabakh, the Azerbaijanis decisively considered their own. In their turn, the Armenian representatives insisted on all these areas. The chief argument of the Azerbaijanis was that these oblasts belonged to Azerbaijan at the time of the Musavat government and yielding them now would harm Soviet power in the eyes of Azerbaijanis, Iran and Turkey. 
As a result of the negotiations conducted in Moscow and Yerevan, on August 10, 1920 was concluded an agreement consisting of six sections. Four of them were devoted to the artificially created territorial dispute with Azerbaijan. In the second section of the treaty, it was noted that with the exception of areas defined by the current agreement for the dislocation of forces of Armenia; the forces of the RSFSR will be dislocated in the districts of Karabakh, Zangazur and Nakhchivan, which are to be considered matters of dispute. The third paragraph specified that “the disputed territories occupied by Soviet forces do not pre-decide the issue about the rights on these territories of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic. By its provisional occupation, the RSFSR has in mind the creation of favorable conditions for the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of the provisions which will be established by a peace treaty which is to be concluded by the RSFSR and the Republic of Armenia in the nearest future.” 
As a matter of fact, the speed at which the treaty between Russia and Armenia was concluded is explained by the fact that on exactly the same date was concluded the Sevres Treaty between Turkey and the Entente. The Sevres Treaty promised the Armenians great dividends and Soviet Russian diplomacy was concerned that Armenia might entirely fall under the influence of the Entente. The Sevres Treaty became the chief external factor which forced G. Chichern speedily to conclude the agreement with Armenia. And the even not yet prepared as a diplomatic document, this agreement under pressure from Moscow was signed, and the Azerbaijani lands which were transformed by Soviet Russia into disputed ones were promised to Armenia.
From the very first days of the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, preparations were carried out so that the indisputable lands of Azerbaijan were declared disputable, which is what we see in the Russian-Armenian accord. G. Ordzhonikidze, who had been sent to Azerbaijan, on June 19, 1920, sent a telegram to V.I. Lenin and G. Chicherin reporting that in Karabakh and Zangazur, Soviet power had been proclaimed and that both these territories consider themselves part of Azerbaijan. He warned: “Azerbaijan cannot get along in any way without Karabakh and Zangazur. In general, in my opinion, a representative of Azerbaijan should be called to Moscow and together with him be resolved all questions concerning Azerbaijan and Armenia, and this should be done before the signing of an agreement with Armenia [because] a repetition of the Zakatala events by the Armenians would end with undermining our position here.” 
The August 10 agreement concluded between Soviet Russia and Armenia without Azerbaijan being informed, however, was the result of a policy chosen by the Central Bolshevik government and particularly the Peoples Commissariat of International Affairs of Soviet Russia, which was directed at harming the interests of Azerbaijan.
In the territorial disputes of the two republics, someone very much wanted that Armenia would win. For this, certain leading workers at the Center were not averse to using deception or even provoking elements. Long before the signing of the accord [with Armenia], G. Chicherin in a report suggested to V. Lenin that “the Azerbaijan government has made a claim on Karabakh, Zangazur, and Sharur-Daralagez district along with Nakhchivan, Ordubad, and Dzhulfa … To support this combination through the use of Russian units is totally impermissible. Our role must be absolutely objective and strictly dispassionate. It would be a fatal mistake for all our policy in the East if we were to begin to base ourselves on one national element against another national element. To take from Armenia some portions and hand them over to Azerbaijan would mean to give a false coloration to all our policy in the East.”  Chicherin was then able to include part of his proposals in the official instructions sent to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front, where he in the name of the Central Committee of the party instructed them not to allow Azerbaijani or Armenian organs into the disputed territories. However, the territories he declared disputed were in fact the territories of Azerbaijan and were under the control of Azerbaijani organs of power, which means that the directive of Chicherin was a crude violation of the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
As we see, difficult days had arrived for the new powers in Azerbaijan. On the one hand, giving itself over to revolutionary pathos, the Azerbaijani Soviet power considered itself close to Soviet Russia, but on the other hand, by the hands of its worker-peasant allies in Soviet Russia were being taken away lands which indisputably belonged to Azerbaijan under the earlier government. This processes continued in such an unattractive form that even Soviet workers sent from Moscow to Azerbaijan recognized the injustice of such a relationship to the republic. One of these witnesses, the chairman of the Council of the National Economy of the Azerbaijan SSR N. Solovyev, in an extensive report to V.I. Lenin noted that, “There was hope in Moscow. But the peace treaties with Georgia and Armenia, the handing over to these republics of part of Azerbaijani territory with a Muslim population, have shattered, if not absolutely killed, this hope: according to the conclusion by the Muslim masses, not only did Moscow seize Azerbaijan, but is also endowing Armenia and Georgia at its expense. The treaty with Armenia—by which part of Azerbaijani territory with exclusively Muslim population was given to Armenia, the railway which had enormous strategic and economic importance was given up, and the single corridor directly connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey was destroyed—has been received particularly badly. What is one to say to ordinary Muslims when certain members of the Azerbaijan Communist Party explain such a treaty by saying that it has been drawn up according to directives from influential Armenians in the Center who call themselves communists, but who in reality are conscious or unconscious nationalists.” 
Such high-handed actions by Soviet Russia in relation to Azerbaijan generated the anger of N. Narimanov. He well understood that the chief organizers of these provocative games were the Peoples Commissar of International Affairs G. Chicherin, who from the summer of 1919 had stood in opposition to the eastern policy pushed by Narimanov, and the assistant peoples commissar L. Karakhan. Both occupied leading positions, which allowed them to define and in practice to carry out the foreign and especially the Eastern policy of the Soviets. In the struggle with Chicherin, N. Narimanov viewed the intervention of Lenin as the only way out because Lenin had before Sovietization given many beautiful promises. Still believing in the justice of Lenin’s position concerning Azerbaijan, N. Narimanov in the middle of July wrote the following: “With the telegram of Comrade Chicherin, it is clear that Your information is one-sided or that the Center is being subjected to the influence of those who even now act jointly with the Denikin forces against Soviet power in Azerbaijan. If it is profitable to the Center to sacrifice Azerbaijan and to retain for itself only Baku with its oil and to stop conducting any Eastern Policy, then this can be done, but I warn: It is impossible to hold Baku without all of Azerbaijan in the neighborhood with the traitor Dashnaks and Georgian Mensheviks. On the other hand, I would like to find out how the Center view us, Muslims, and how it can resolve such important questions without us. The Center can relate to us with a lack of trust, but then even such responsible workers as Ordzhonikidze and Mdivani will not agree with such a decision. I say directly that the Center has taken the weapon from our hands and by its decisions about Karabakh and so on intensified, and provided support for, the provocation of the Musavat, which all the time insists that Muslim Communists have sold Azerbaijan to Russia, which recognizes the independence of Armenia and Georgia and, at the same time, considers for some reason the hitherto indisputable territories of Azerbaijan matters of dispute. Comrade Chicherin speaks about subordination to the policy of the center, but does the Center realize that this very same center is forcing us into an untenable position. … People here tell us directly: ‘You cannot secure for Azerbaijan completely undisputable territories, but continue talking about the liberation of the East.’” 
In another letter to V.I. Lenin, N. Narimanov warned about the serious danger threatening Azerbaijan: “A terrible situation is being created. The Center recognized the independence of Georgia and Armenia and recognized the independence of Azerbaijan, but at the same time, the Center is giving totally indisputable territories of Azerbaijan to Armenia. If these same territories were given to Georgia, it would be possible somehow to struggle to win over public opinion, but to give them to Armenia, this is an unjustified and fatal mistake” (Narimanov 1990, p. 117).
Despite the tough and even at times sharply oppositional position of N. Narimanov, Soviet Russia chose to prefer the policy of denigrating Azerbaijan that had been developed by the Peoples Commissariat of International Affairs. In a diplomatic dispatch sent on July 20 by G. Chicherin to N. Narimanov, there was the following sarcastic comment: “Up until now not in one telegram was clarified to us by you or Ordzhonikidze why the occupation of Karabakh and Zangazur by Russian forces does not satisfy you and other local communists and why is required their immediate annexation to Azerbaijan. … We need to develop relations with Armenia for it could happen that if Turkey turns against us, Armenia, even a Dashnak Armenia, could be an advanced post in the struggle against the attacking Turks.”  In another letter, G. Chicherin warned the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) that one should approach Armenian-Azerbaijani relations by taking the position of Turkish policy into account. He wrote: “In the discussion of Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute, I have all the time indicated that in the case of a turn in Turkish policy toward the path of conquest in the Caucasus, Armenia will be a barrier against it and will defend us.” 
As the position of Soviet Russia in Azerbaijan strengthened, this republic was step by step transformed into an advance post for the regional policy of the Bolsheviks, and on account of its natural resources, the position of the Georgian and Armenian bourgeois republics was weakened, and favorable conditions were created for the Sovietization of Armenia. In a code cable to V.I. Lenin sent by Legran on September 23, 1920, the intentions of Soviet Russia relative to Azerbaijani territories were defined in the following way: one should not be concerned about the transfer of Zangazur and Nakhchivan to Armenia. The very thought that these territories are needed by us for liberation military operations in the Turkish and Tabriz directions is utopian. And thus it is impossible to disagree with the territorial claims of Azerbaijan. The objective and well-based support from Moscow undoubtedly will satisfy Azerbaijan. As for Karabakh, it is possible to insist on its unification with Azerbaijan.  In another telegram on October 24, 1920, sent to G. Chicherin, B. Legran described his agreement with Armenians concerning Azerbaijani territories in the following way: “The Armenians have made the immediate recognition of their position with regard to Nakhchivan and Zangazur a categorical condition. I indicated that without Azerbaijan, this question cannot be resolved and that only by Armenia’s dropping of claims to Karabakh could we put this before Azerbaijan. The Armenians agreed after long discussions and with inessential qualifications to withdraw as far as Karabakh is concerned.”  But this refusal turned out to be premature, and at the end of November 1920, with the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia, the struggle for the mountainous part of Karabakh entered a new stage.
Narimanov, Nariman (1990) K Istorii Nashey Revolyutsii v Okrainakh (Pis’mo I.V. Stalinu) [On the History of Our Revolution in the Provinces (Letter to Stalin)], Baku.
 “The Results of Soviet Construction in Azerbaijan,” The Report of N. Narimanov to V.I. Lenin, 15 September 1921, Russian State Archive of Social-Political History (hereafter RSASPH), f. 5, op. 1, d. 1219, l. 12; The Letter of N. Narimanov to V.I. Lenin, Political Documents Archive under the President of Azerbaijan Republic (hereafter PDA PAR), f. 609, op. 1, d. 71, l. 51.
 Telegram of S. Kirov to G. Chicherin, 29 June 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2178, l. 1.
 Telegram of N. Narimanov, M. Mdivani, A. Mikoyan, and A. Nuridzhanyan to G. Chicherin, 19 June 1920, State Archive of Azerbaijan Republic (hereafter GA AR), f. 28, op. 1, d. 211, l. 115.
 Letter of Peoples Commissar of International Affairs G. Chicherin to the Politburo of the CC RCP(b), 22 June 1920, PDA PAR, f. 1, op. 1, d. 2a, l. 9.
 Response of G. Chicherin to a query by V. Lenin, June 1920, RSASPH, f. 2, op. 1, d. 1451, l. 1.
 Letter of Narimanov, Mdivani, Mikoyan, Naneyshvili, Vesnik, Levandovsky and Mikhailov to the Central Committee of the RCP(b), 10 July 1920, PDA PAR, f. 1, op. 44, d. 118, l. 25-27.
 Code Cable of G. Chicherin to G. Ordzhonikidze, 2 July 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, op. 3s, d. 2, l. 3.
 Response of G.K. Ordzhonikidze by direct line to the statement of Chicherin on 2 July concerning territories in dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia, July 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, op. 3s, d. 2, l. 6.
 Reminder by Ordzhonikidze by direct line to V. Lenin, I. Stalin, and G. Chicherin, July 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, op. 3s, d. 2, l. 8-9.
 Telegram of G. Ordzhonikidze to G. Chicherin, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, op. 1, d. 17, l. 53.
 Note by direct line to Allilueva, 7 July 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, op. 3s, d. 2, l. 20.
 Telegram of G. Chicherin to G. Ordzhonikidze, 8 July 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, op. 1, d. 17, l. 60.
 Telegram of G. Ordzhonikidze to V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin and G.K. Chicherin, 16 July 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, op. 3s, d. 2, l. 12.
 Telegram of A. Mikoyan to G. Ordzhonikidze, 29 June 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, op. 1, d. 17, l. 134.
 Code cable of G. Ordzhonikidze and S. Kirov to V. Lenin and I. Stalin, 12 June 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, op. 2s, d. 2, l. 9-11.
 Telegram of G. Ordzhonikidze to G. Chicherin, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, op. 1, d. 17, l. 304.
 Letter of S. Kirov to G. Chicherin, 6 August 1920, RSASPH, f. 80, op. 4, d. 102k, l. 1-2.
 The text of the agreement between the RSFSR and the Republic of Armenia, 10 August 1920, PDA PAR, f. 1, op. 169, d. 249/II, l. 11-12.
 Telegram of G. Ordzhonikidze to V.I. Lenin and G. Chicherin, 19 June 1920, PDA PAR, f. 1, op. 169, d. 249/I, l. 34.
 Copy of a note to V.I. Lenin, 29 June 1920, PDA PAR, f. 1, op. 1, d. 2a, l. 13-14.
 Information of N.I. Solovyev to V.I. Lenin, “Our Policy in Azerbaijan for Two Months (May-June) after the Revolution,” 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, op. 84, d. 58, l. 15.
 Letter of N. Narimanov to V.I. Lenin, July 1920, PDA PAR, f. 609, op. 1, d. 71, l. 41-42.
 Dispath of G. Chicherin to N. Narimanov, 20 July 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2097, l. 1.
 Letter of G. Chicherin to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), 5 October 1920, Foreign Policy Archive of Russian Federation (hereafter FPA RF), f. 04, op. 39, folder 232, d. 52987, l. 40.
 Telegram of B. Legran to V.I. Lenin, 23 September 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, op. 1, d. 21, l. 144.
 Secret telegram of B. Legran to G. Chicherin, 24 October 1920, SRASPH, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2178, l. 20.