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By Murad Gassanly
The current state of US-Azeri relations is a hot topic for local and international commentators and observers. Discussion of the issue almost invariably leads to attempts to diagnose the causes of deterioration in a previously close strategic partnership. And these causes are almost invariably found in the alleged hostility in Washington towards an increasingly confident Baku.

This view is also shared amongst Azerbaijan experts in the United States, many of whom suddenly engaged in uncharacteristic self-flagellation. Thus, Ariel Cohen of the US Heritage Foundation, recently called on the United States to “begin a new strategic dialogue with Azerbaijan, raising this issue at a high level and restoring the confidence and support of pro-western orientation in policy in Baku”. Veteran Azerbaijan-watcher Thomas Goltz in a well-received article in the Foreign Policy helpfully provided “the list of American insults”, which, he argues, “is long and growing longer”. There seems to be a consensus that bilateral relations are at all time low and, as far as the supporters of President Ilham Aliev’s regime are concerned, the fault lies entirely with the US and the Obama administration in particular.

They draw attention to a series of alleged diplomatic snubs and slights. Delay in the appointment of a new US ambassador to Azerbaijan, and President Aliev not being invited to the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in 2009 are most frequently mentioned examples, amongst others. There is also the issue of the sensational article in Washington Post alleging that Aliev’s 11-year old son owned millions of dollars’ worth of real estate in Dubai – allegations Aliev did not deny, despite being reportedly furious and blaming the State Department for leaking the story to the Post.

More seriously, there is the matter of the infamous Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act passed by Congress in 1992. The caveat restricted US government-to-government aid to Baku in the context of Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territories of Nagorno Karabakh and regions around it. Azerbaijan, having lost 16% of its internationally recognised territory, was essentially penalised by the US, largely due to pressure from the powerful Armenian lobby in the Congress. As Goltz argues, Section 907 raises doubts in Baku about US being “an honest broker”, given that America is a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, an international body charged with finding a peaceful solution to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

The issue came to the fore last year when President Obama launched a new initiative to improve Armenian-Turkish relations. US supported the efforts to normalise relations by way of opening the Armenian-Turkish border, closed by Ankara in 1993 after Armenian army conquered and ethnically cleansed Azerbaijani region of Kelbajar outside Nagorno-Karabakh. The US policy took form of Armenian-Turkish Protocols signed in Zurich in October 2009. Critics of the US argue that this diplomatic initiative came at Azerbaijan’s expense and sought to exclude and isolate Azerbaijani concerns over Karabakh.

Azerbaijan vigorously opposed US efforts, successfully lobbying Turkey on the issue and forcing Ankara to publicly include progress on Karabakh negotiations as a pre-condition for the continuation of Armenian-Turkish rapprochement. The sabotage of “the Obama-inspired accords”, according to Goltz was seen as “a nearly existential diplomatic victory for Baku”.

Ultimately, there is a growing perception that US is not interested in friendship with Azerbaijan and views the country as a means to different political ends – war in Afganistan being the key priority at the moment. Continued Azerbaijani support for US military effort against the Taleban was at the top of agenda during the US Defence Secretary Robert Gates’ visit to Baku earlier this month. The fear in Washington is that Aliev administration may reduce its level of military cooperation with the United States and even shut down critical air, rail and sea-port access granted to NATO forces in the wake of 9/11 terror attacks. Many in Baku are annoyed at what they see as dismissive and cynical attitude of American leaders. It is no surprise that Gates was not invited to dine with the Azeri President. US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s upcoming visit to Azerbaijan is also expected to be a difficult and strained affair.

Yet there is a different and, perhaps, a more accurate reading of the situation. For starters the United States can produce its own lengthy (and rather disturbing) list of Azerbaijani insults and snubs. The cracks in the relations between US and Azerbaijan were evident as far back as 2005. Back then, Azerbaijani authorities, mindful of US involvement in supporting pro-democracy movements in Ukraine and Georgia and with parliamentary elections approaching, took drastic steps to reduce American influence in Azerbaijan.

The bullying and intimidation of the staff at the Baku office of the National Democratic Institute was the most serious incident of that period. NDI was accused of supporting youth organisations charged with trying “to overthrow the state”. Personnel at NDI had their homes broken into and trashed, whilst being subjected to hostile media attacks. It took an unprecedented emergency visit by the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to repair the damage but at the cost of full-scale replacement of NDI Baku senior executive staff. In fact NDI never fully recovered and its local operations and programmes have been significantly curtailed. It is unlikely that Democrats (now in office) have forgotten or forgiven humiliation their colleagues suffered in Azerbaijan.

Despite the NDI incident and the fact that November 2005 elections were blatantly and violently rigged by the Aliev regime, President Bush invited the Azeri leader to Washington on a state visit in 2006. Two years later Vice President Dick Cheney received a far less welcome reception when he arrived in Baku to seek Aliev’s support for US regional policy in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Georgia.

Moreover in December 2008 authorities in Baku shut down Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcasts on national frequencies (along with Radio Free Europe and BBC). The Soviet-style move decimated VOA audience and was seen as yet another attempt to curtail freedom of expression in Azerbaijan. This is no mere diplomatic snub - this is a hostile political action aimed at further reducing American influence in Azerbaijan. Something like this might be expected from Iran or Armenia, but not from a US-allied, friendly country. State Department was understandably furious.

This short chronological analysis suggests that the first shots in US-Azerbaijani stand-off were fired by the Aliev regime, with US policy slowly developing in response. In fact, criticisms of US policy towards Azerbaijan fall apart under closer scrutiny.

The notorious Section 907 mentioned above was almost immediately negated by President Clinton and effectively suspended by President Bush. Despite of protestations from American-Armenian lobby the United States pursued pro-Azerbaijani and pro-Turkish policies throughout the last 15 years, helping Azerbaijan to isolate Armenia and exclude that country from regional economic and energy projects, and, of course, not recognising events of 1915 in Ottoman Empire as “Armenian genocide”.

When it comes to Armenian-Turkish rapprochement initiative, critics of the United States seem to suffer from collective amnesia. President Obama was very keen to include Baku in his regional policy in the wake of the war in Georgia. The initiative began with Obama’s historic visit to Istanbul in April 2009. Many have forgotten that President Aliev was invited to join President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan to discuss American plans. Here was a unique opportunity for the Azeri leader to place Karabakh issue at the very heart of US regional strategy, or at the very least personally inform his American counterpart and Turkish ally of the strength of feeling on the issue in Baku. In a pathetic display of petulance Aliev chose to snub Obama, leaving US leadership with no choice but to try and exclude him from the Armenian-Turkish peace effort. The matter was further compounded by Aliev’s spectacularly childish move in signing a symbolic gas deal with Russian state monopoly Gazprom.

Far from being an existential victory for Azerbaijani diplomacy, Aliev’s undermining of US interests in the region seriously harmed our long-term strategic national interest. Non-invitation of Aliev to the Nuclear Summit and the Washington Post article should well be read in this context. The question to Aliev’s supporters and apologists is simple – what do you think was going to happen? One cannot expect to slap a US president and expect not to get punched in return.

What is worse, contrary to self-congratulatory rhetoric in the Azeri state media, Armenian-Turkish Protocols are far from dead and the issue is likely to come back with a vengeance after the Turkish elections next year. Many commentators are confident that, since neither party had withdrawn their signatures from the Protocols, the issue of ratification is a matter of time and further negotiations. Aliev can certainly expect to be excluded from these. After all, he was outplayed by the Turkish leadership who, having promised in April 2009 not to sign any agreements with Armenia, still went ahead with signing of the Protocols just a few months later.

Yet the most important issue in US-Azeri relations remains strangely absent from the analysis of critics of American policy - that is energy. Whilst it is true that Afganistan and war on terror are foremost in current US calculations (and rightly so), the long-term American goals in the Caspian/Central Asian region remain unchanged – energy security, diversification of energy supplies and promotion of multiple pipeline systems together remain a strategic priority for Washington. This was true under Clinton and Bush administrations and remains true today.

At a time when Russia is rapidly increasing her own energy transportation capacity and seeks to undermine US-backed projects in the region, position taken by the Aliev regime, especially in regards to the Nabucco Pipeline, helps to better understand Washington’s growing frustration with Baku. Aliev’s policy on the issue can only be described as obstructionist – signing deals with Gazprom, delaying agreements on gas prices with Turkey, negotiating alternative pipeline projects that do not serve American and, in fact, Azerbaijani, strategic interests and so on. Local and international observers are in agreement that Aliev is moving Azerbaijan closer and closer into the Russian orbit.

There can be little doubt that his relations with the United States are no way near the close and successful partnership with Washington painstakingly built by his late father Heydar. This partnership centred on energy cooperation and resulted in the construction of BTC oil pipeline – the biggest gem in the crown of Azerbaijani independence. This is what President Obama meant when he stated in a personal letter to Ilham Aliev that he wished for US-Azerbaijani relations to be restored to the levels they were when senior Aliev was President.

The United States does not wish to lose an ally and has no interest in undermining Azerbaijani interests. US consistently back the Aliev dynasty, despite horrendous human rights abuses and increasing authoritarianism of the regime. Whilst Washington continues to call for greater democratisation, American leadership (Obama administration no exception) embraces real politic considerations with an enviable consistency. Appointment of Matthew Bryza, former US co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk group, as the new US ambassador to Baku serves to underline that point. Bryza enjoys a close and long-standing relationship with Azerbaijani government, and his wife Zeyno Baran, a Turkish American scholar, Director of the Center for Eurasian Policy and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in DC, is well known for her support for the Aliev regime.

Next month’s planned visit to Azerbaijan by US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton is going to be crucial for US-Azerbaijani relations. It is essential for Azerbaijani authorities to get rid of the arrogant mindset that holds that America needs Azerbaijan more than Azerbaijan needs America. Such overconfidence (which, perhaps, comes from owning too many villas in Dubai) can have costly and long-term repercussions for Azerbaijan, a country surrounded by hostile states and with its historic heartland under enemy occupation. The Aliev administration would do well to listen to Clinton and respond to American concerns in a more constructive manner. It is essential to respond positively to US criticisms of Aliev’s human rights record and most importantly to get US-Azeri cooperation in the energy sphere back on track.

Consequences of undermining US interests in the region are extremely costly and President Aliev is beginning to experience them. This is not merely a matter of a brief outburst of anger in Washington. This can have a long-term, structural impact on Azerbaijan’s strategic position in the Eurasian political economy.